fix(security): pin etils-actions/pypi-auto-publish and other Actions to commit SHAs#11213
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XananasX7 wants to merge 1 commit into
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fix(security): pin etils-actions/pypi-auto-publish and other Actions to commit SHAs#11213XananasX7 wants to merge 1 commit into
XananasX7 wants to merge 1 commit into
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…to SHAs etils-actions/pypi-auto-publish@v1 is a tag-pinned third-party action in the release workflow with PYPI_PASSWORD secret. A supply-chain attack via tag redirect could backdoor tensorflow-datasets on PyPI.
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Summary
The
release.ymlworkflow usesetils-actions/pypi-auto-publish@v1— a mutable tag reference on a third-party action (only ~10 GitHub stars). If thev1tag is silently redirected (compromised maintainer, tag deletion + recreation), malicious code executes in the job holdingPYPI_PASSWORD, enabling a supply-chain attack backdooringtensorflow-datasetson PyPI — a package with millions of downstream users.Additional tag-pinned first-party actions (
actions/checkout@v3,actions/setup-python@v4,styfle/cancel-workflow-action@0.7.0) in CI and release workflows also pinned to commit SHAs.Follows the GitHub security hardening guide.