Credit the deployer's HyperCore account from HyperEVM - #147
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A deployer funded only for EVM gas cannot opt into HyperEVM's big blocks: `evmUserModify` is accepted only from an address HyperCore already knows, and an address becomes one by holding a Core asset. HYPE is HyperEVM's native gas token and value sent to the system contract at 0x2222222222222222222222222222222222222222 is credited on Core to the sender, so the deployer credits itself out of the balance it already has, with no external bridge in it. `LibHyperCore` carries the mechanism and every guard; `CreditHyperCore` is the entry point, run by hand with an amount in `HYPERCORE_CREDIT_WEI`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A direct value transfer moves the sender's balance and the recipient's together or moves neither, so of the two post-transfer checks only one can ever fire: the only input that gets past every guard and still moves nothing is one where the two balances are the same balance, which is `account` being the system contract itself. Whichever check is written first is the one that fires there, and the second is unreachable by construction — a line no mutation of it can be killed on. So `UnexpectedAccountBalance` and the sender-side check go, and the system side stays, because that is the side Core reads the credit from. `testCreditThatMovesNothingIsRefused` sends from the system contract to the system contract, which is the one input that reaches the remaining assertion, and is worth refusing on its own terms: a run that credited the system contract's own Core account and reported success is the silent success this library is arranged against. The `CreditFailed` and `UnexpectedSystemBalance` NatSpec now say why each is there, including that `CreditFailed` is unreachable through the pins and is kept anyway. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
WalkthroughThe PR adds a Forge script and ChangesHyperCore crediting
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to The README command can expose the deployer private key through shell history when copied as written. The PR is otherwise mergeable, but the documentation should provide safer key-entry instructions or clearly warn owners before use. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Operator
participant CreditHyperCore
participant LibHyperCore
participant HypeSystemContract
Operator->>CreditHyperCore: Provide environment variables
CreditHyperCore->>LibHyperCore: creditCoreOnHyperEvm(deployer, amount)
LibHyperCore->>LibHyperCore: Select fork and validate credit
LibHyperCore->>HypeSystemContract: Transfer native HYPE
HypeSystemContract-->>LibHyperCore: Increase system balance
LibHyperCore-->>Operator: Complete or revert
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Inline comments:
In `@README.md`:
- Around line 424-427: Update the deployment command documentation around
CreditHyperCore to avoid placing DEPLOYMENT_KEY inline in shell history: read
the key silently into the environment before running the command, and note that
it should be unset after deployment.
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README.mdscript/CreditHyperCore.solsrc/lib/LibHyperCore.soltest/src/lib/LibHyperCore.t.sol
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Acted on the merge-risk note about the key in shell history — it was right, and this was the only place in the repo documenting a key on a command line at all (the deploy reaches its key through a workflow secret), so it was also the only place that could teach the habit.
No test moves with it: it is a docs-and-comments change, and |
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A deployer funded only to pay EVM gas cannot deploy anything sizeable to
HyperEVM. Anything past the fast block's gas cap has to go in a big block, big
blocks are opted into with an
evmUserModifyaction, and HyperCore accepts thataction only from an address it already knows — one holding a Core asset. A fresh
EVM deployer is not that address, and the usual answer is to bridge something in
from outside.
It does not have to be. HYPE is HyperEVM's native gas token rather than an ERC20,
and value sent to the system contract at
0x2222222222222222222222222222222222222222is credited on Core to whoever sentit. The deployer already holds HYPE — that is what it pays gas in — so it credits
itself, and the whole prerequisite collapses into one value transfer with no
third party in it.
src/lib/LibHyperCore.sol— the mechanism and every guard.script/CreditHyperCore.sol— the entry point. ReadsDEPLOYMENT_KEYandHYPERCORE_CREDIT_WEI, and is three lines because everything with behaviouris in the library.
test/src/lib/LibHyperCore.t.sol— 13 tests, three of them against a liveHyperEVM fork.
Nothing automatic can reach it
This is not on
Manual sol artifacts, and no workflow is added for it. Thatworkflow exports
DEPLOYMENT_SUITE,DEPLOYMENT_NETWORKandDEPLOYMENT_KEYand nothing else, so a real-money amount has no honest path through it — an
amount squeezed into one of those names would be travelling under a name that
means something else. It is hand-run, and the README says to dry-run it first:
without
--broadcastit forks HyperEVM and executes every guard and thetransfer itself while sending nothing, so anything the real run would refuse is
refused for free.
Nothing was broadcast in producing this. The fork tests read the live chain and
send nothing.
The guards, in the order they run
Where, then what, then who — the first two decide whether the value is
recoverable at all.
UnexpectedChainId—block.chainid != 999, before anything else is read.That address is a system contract on HyperEVM and an ordinary unowned address
everywhere else, where value sent to it is not refused, just gone. The chain
id and not an RPC alias, because rainix's rpc-preflight rebinds
HYPEREVM_RPC_URLat run time: the alias says which endpoint answered, thechain id says what it answered as.
SystemContractChanged— the code hash at the system address against a pin.A fork of HyperEVM reports HyperEVM's chain id while holding whatever state
its operator put there, and an address with no code at all reports the zero
hash, so a chain that simply does not have this contract fails here rather
than accepting the transfer into a hole.
ZeroCredit, thenCreditNotRound— HYPE carries 8 wei decimals on Coreagainst 18 on the EVM, so a credit is the EVM amount divided by
10 ** 10and the remainder is burned, not returned. An amount below one Core wei
is burned in full: the transfer succeeds, the HYPE is gone, and the address
is still not a HyperCore user. Refused rather than rounded, because that
silent success is the failure the whole script exists to avoid.
InsufficientBalance— strictly greater than, because gas on HyperEVM comesout of the same balance, so an account holding exactly
amountcannot sendamount.UnexpectedSystemBalance— Core reads the log thetransfer emits, not the call's return status, so a call that succeeded
without moving value is not a credit.
There is one post-transfer assertion rather than two, and the second commit here
is why: a direct value transfer moves both balances or neither, so the only
input that reaches either one is an
accountthat IS the system contract, andwhichever side is checked first is the side that fires. The other side is
unreachable by construction — a line no mutation of it could ever be killed on.
The system side is the one kept, because it is the side Core reads.
Checked against the chain and the docs, not assumed
receive()emitsReceived(address indexed user, uint256 amount): the pinned runtime bytecodecame from
eth_getCodeagainst HyperEVM, and its embedded topic0 literalequals
cast keccak "Received(address,uint256)".eth_chainId=0x3e7= 999.keccakof that fetched runtime code, andtestTheLiveSystemContractIsWhatIsPinnedre-checks it against the livecontract on every run.
weiDecimals: 8for HYPE from the HyperliquidspotMetainfo API, re-read while opening this PR.QA
Discriminating tests: all 13 in
LibHyperCoreTest, listed with their killedmutants below. This is a new library, so every one of them fails on base by
not compiling — that is not discriminating evidence and is not offered as
any. The mutation table is the evidence: each test is shown killing a specific
break of the specific line it claims to cover.
Mutations applied: 13, one at a time to
src/lib/LibHyperCore.sol, restoredbetween. 12 killed, 1 survived and is disclosed rather than papered over:
LibHyperCore.solif (block.chainid != HYPEREVM_CHAIN_ID)→if (false)testCreditRefusesEveryChainButHyperEvmHYPEREVM_CHAIN_ID999→998testTheLiveSystemContractIsWhatIsPinned,testCreditOnAHyperEvmFork,testCreditOnHyperEvmForksTheAliasBeforeItsGuardsif (…codehash != HYPE_SYSTEM_CODEHASH)→if (false)testCreditRefusesASystemContractThatIsNotTheOneHYPE_SYSTEM_CODEHASHlast nibble2→3testHypeSystemBytecodeHashesToThePinnedCodehashand 9 othersif (amount == 0)→if (false)testCreditRefusesZeroif (amount % HYPE_EVM_WEI_PER_CORE_WEI != 0)→if (false)testCreditRefusesAnAmountThatIsNotAWholeCoreWei,testCreditRefusesAnAmountBelowOneCoreWeiHYPE_CORE_DECIMALS8→9testOneCoreWeiIsTheDecimalGapif (account.balance <= amount)→<testCreditRefusesAnAccountThatCannotAlsoPayGasvm.broadcast(account)testCreditSendsTheAmountAndCreditsTheSendingAccount,testCreditThatMovesNothingIsRefused,testCreditOnAHyperEvmForkif (!success)→if (false)UnexpectedSystemBalancechecktestCreditThatMovesNothingIsRefusedcreditCoreOnHyperEvm: drop thevm.createSelectForktestCreditOnHyperEvmForksTheAliasBeforeItsGuardsHYPE_SYSTEM_ADDRESSlast nibble2→3testTheLiveSystemContractIsWhatIsPinned,testCreditOnAHyperEvmFork,testCreditOnHyperEvmForksTheAliasBeforeItsGuardsMethod: one mutation at a time, whole
LibHyperCoreTestsuite run against it,file restored between. M2, M12 and M13 are killed only by fork tests, so each
was re-run paired with a 13/13 green baseline taken immediately before it —
the public
rpc.hyperliquid.xyzendpoint rate-limits, and a fork test red forthat reason would otherwise be recorded as a kill it did not make.
M10 SURVIVES and is not fixable by a test.
HYPE_SYSTEM_BYTECODEreverts onlyon a call carrying calldata, this call carries none, and
InsufficientBalancehas already established the call is funded — so no input gets a
falseout ofit while the pins hold. The check stays: an unchecked low-level call is a
defect on its own terms, loosening either pin would make it reachable, and
without it a failed transfer would be misreported as
UnexpectedSystemBalance. Its NatSpec says exactly this. The alternative todisclosing it was deleting the guard to make the number 13/13, which is a
worse library.
Oracle: the Hyperliquid docs and the live chain, never recomputed by the
implementation. The system address and its
receive()log signature come frometh_getCodepluscast keccak "Received(address,uint256)"; the chain id frometh_chainId; the codehash fromcast keccakover the fetched runtime code;the 8-decimal Core figure from the
spotMetainfo API, re-read againstapi.hyperliquid.xyzwhile writing this. The fork tests assert against thecontract actually deployed at the system address rather than a mock that
agrees with the library.
Category check: no issue is open for this — it was briefed directly rather
than filed, so there is no issue text to check coverage against. What the
change sets out to do is let the deployer credit its own HyperCore account out
of the HyperEVM HYPE it already holds, so it can opt into big blocks.
Covered: the mechanism, an amount taken as input rather than defaulted, the
chain-999 guard, the repo's conventions (
src/library plusscript/entry,test/src/**mirroringsrc/**, unnamed returns, REUSE headers), andpre-transfer and post-transfer assertions. Deliberately NOT covered, each with
its reason in the source: no CI workflow (no honest path for the amount
through
Manual sol artifacts), no test drivingrun()(it would need towrite the process-global
DEPLOYMENT_KEY, racingRainDeployBroadcastTest;instead
run()is typed so a transposed key and amount will not compile), andno fuzzing of the fork tests (a fresh fork per run rate-limits the public
endpoint).
Local gates
forge fmt --check,forge buildandforge test --match-contract LibHyperCoreTest(13/13) all pass here. The full local suite is 340/345, andall 5 failures are
vm.createSelectForkagainst the publicrpc.hyperliquid.xyzendpoint, which rate-limits this box — they are inRainDeployVerifyChain*, untouched by this branch, andmainis green on CI.CI is the arbiter for the rest;
reuse lintandslitherare on it.Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Documentation