Skip to content
View mtorun0x7cd's full-sized avatar
💭
Designing Zero Trust architectures
💭
Designing Zero Trust architectures

Sponsoring

@DavidAnson

Block or report mtorun0x7cd

Block user

Prevent this user from interacting with your repositories and sending you notifications. Learn more about blocking users.

You must be logged in to block users.

Content in all repositories owned by your account will be closed.
Maximum 250 characters. Please don’t include any personal information such as legal names or email addresses. Markdown is supported. This note will only be visible to you.
Report abuse

Contact GitHub support about this user’s behavior. Learn more about reporting abuse.

Report abuse
mtorun0x7cd/README.md

A zsh session in a terminal window of 56 by 11 characters, at the prompt of the user mtorun0x7cd. whoami prints mtorun0x7cd; git config user.name prints Mert Torun; cat focus.txt prints Verification of Safety-Critical Systems and Information Security; ls works/ lists bachelors-thesis, masters-thesis and working-paper. A cursor rests at the next prompt. Below the window, two labels read Research & Development and @mtorun0x7cd.

Mert Torun, M.Sc.

Verification of Safety-Critical Systems · Information Security

Website: mtorun0x7cd.com ORCID: 0009-0003-7932-9043 DOI: 10.57684/COS-1494 LinkedIn: mtorun0x7cd

I work on the verification of safety-critical systems and on information security (M.Sc. in Computer Science & Engineering, TH Köln) and have published a refereed paper setting out a verification methodology for retrofitted anti-skid systems in European public transport. My work concerns the conditions under which a system can be trusted: the verification and validation of safety-critical systems, identity and access management, the hardening of enterprise infrastructure toward Zero Trust, and cryptographic architectures that make the integrity and authenticity of digital artifacts provable. I read these problems through the established assurance literature (functional-safety, software-verification, and security-evaluation standards), treating their methods as a shared vocabulary rather than a checklist. The orienting question across these domains is the same: under what conditions a system's claimed properties can be demonstrated rather than asserted.

A second commitment runs through this work: that engineering claims should be reproducible and independently checkable. I operate self-hosted, privacy-respecting infrastructure end to end and cryptographically sign the commits and tags I push to the repositories under this account, my email and the documents I issue. I treat reproducibility as a property of the engineering itself, and self-hosting as its consequence: the provenance and integrity of an artifact are only as trustworthy as the chain that produced and serves it.

The repositories below are work under this account, together with the upstream extension I contribute to: the repositories of the works listed under Publications, the conventions the other projects are built to, and archives of completed academic and engineering work, most of them student team projects, among them web platforms, a multi-tier Java desktop application, humanoid robotics, and cryptographic education. The archived projects are preserved as records rather than maintained as living tools, documented so that their methods and results remain legible after the work has closed.


Publications

All three are open access and listed with their DOIs and URNs on my ORCID record.


Repositories

Published works

  • anti-skid-verification: two-layer functional-equivalence verification for safety-critical FPGA rail retrofits; the repository of the paper listed under Publications.
  • thesis-fentwums-container-extension: the repository of the Master's thesis listed under Publications, with its LaTeX sources, the version of record and the cross-platform evaluation apparatus for the container extension below, benchmarking synthesis, place-and-route and simulation across iCE40 and ECP5 with the upstream sources pinned as submodules.
  • raven-one-simulink: educational cryptographic simulator tracing every RSA intermediate step, with a from-scratch MD5 engine (RFC 8017 / RFC 1321); the practical part of the Bachelor's thesis listed under Publications.

Upstream contribution

  • FEntwumS.ContainerExtension: OneWare Studio plugin that runs FPGA toolchains such as GHDL, Yosys and nextpnr in containers (opt-in per tool, with a native-host fallback) and records the image digest of each run; the extension the Master's thesis evaluates, contributed to the FEntwumS project.

Template

  • template: the project template the repositories here are built to, with the meta-file family, licensing information as REUSE defines it, a tokenized README skeleton, one script that runs every check, and the CI, release and secret-scanning workflows.

Archived student projects

  • component-lending-system: PHP/MySQL lending platform for an embedded-systems lab, with tiered role-based access and stock recalculated by schema triggers.
  • coupon-management: Django platform run against two storage engines, with a reproducible PostgreSQL/MongoDB benchmark.
  • nao-ball-pickup: vision-guided ball detection and head tracking, with a fixed-pose pickup motion, for the SoftBank NAO 6 humanoid.
  • warehouse-management-system: multi-tier Java Swing warehouse client over JPA/MySQL.

Cryptographic Verification & Security

The documents I issue, my email, and the commits and tags I push to the repositories under this account are cryptographically signed, so a recipient can check their integrity and authenticity. Two independent mechanisms are used, each verifiable on its own.

Documents & email: official PDF documents and email are signed with an S/MIME certificate. A document signature is detached CMS (RFC 5652): it travels beside the document as DOCUMENT.p7s, never inside it, so a PDF reader shows no signature and none is expected. Checked offline with openssl cms -verify -binary -inform DER -content DOCUMENT -in DOCUMENT.p7s -purpose smimesign -CAfile chain.pem.

  • Verify: offline with the command above. The S/MIME certificate is supplied on request to the email address under Contact.

  • chain.pem: the certificate chain of the issuer in PEM, that is the root D-Trust SBR Root CA 1 2022 and the intermediate D-Trust SBR CA 1-22-1 2022. Both also travel inside each .p7s, and openssl pkcs7 -inform DER -in DOCUMENT.p7s -print_certs lists them; a root taken from there is trusted only after its SHA-256 fingerprint has been compared with an independent source.

  • After expiry: the command checks the certificate at the current time, so it fails once the certificate has expired on 2027-06-21. To check a signature made before that date, add -attime followed by the time of signing in seconds since 1970-01-01 UTC.

  • Certificate fingerprint: confirm the certificate for info@mtorun0x7cd.com (issued by D-Trust SBR CA 1-22-1 2022) against its SHA-256 fingerprint before trusting it:

    11:BC:CF:B3:93:93:06:17:E5:95:87:8A:00:B3:82:43:AC:76:13:00:3E:3A:76:0E:98:B2:AA:05:BF:AD:55:A5
    

Code: the commits and tags I push to the repositories under this account are signed with an SSH key; GitHub renders these as Verified. A change merged on github.com itself carries GitHub's own signature instead, and a fork under this account keeps the commits of its upstream authors.

  • Signing-key fingerprint: the Ed25519 signing key is published at /users/mtorun0x7cd/ssh_signing_keys; confirm it against its SHA-256 fingerprint:

    SHA256:h0XIy0K+hRkQ921LjtoKu/jSPvvlP0r4BiAMuyEPIrI
    
  • Verify: in a clone of this repository or of any repository of this account listed above, with curl, jq and Git, which checks SSH signatures since 2.34. The second command prints the fingerprint above; the third answers Good "git" signature and ends with 0 for a commit I pushed, or ends with 1 for a commit the key did not sign, such as a change merged on github.com. verify-tag checks a release tag the same way.

    curl -s https://api.github.com/users/mtorun0x7cd/ssh_signing_keys | jq -r '"* " + .[].key' > allowed_signers
    ssh-keygen -lf allowed_signers
    git -c gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile=allowed_signers verify-commit HEAD

Support & Sponsorship

If you find my work valuable, you can support it:

  • GitHub Sponsors: recurring or one-time support.

  • Buy Me a Coffee: one-time or monthly contribution.

  • Cryptocurrency:

    View Bitcoin (BTC) & Monero (XMR) Addresses

    Bitcoin (BTC):

    bc1qysjvx7h5dcrxvrzj6mpdrccs0qmescrkqrgzsm
    

    Monero (XMR):

    4397wSjVyk5C7LR2BB3xLUQZeE8M1UBEJhSZ9KRCryFU7HDBZXnSQZHeK4fTUL8FhFXF9cLcTrg9GiY5agqSF7DKKEj8bcP
    

Contact

Mert Torun, M.Sc.: Verification of Safety-Critical Systems · Information Security
mtorun0x7cd · Research & Development

Pinned Loading

  1. anti-skid-verification anti-skid-verification Public

    Working paper and research report, TH Köln, 2026: functional equivalence in retrofitted anti-skid systems. LaTeX sources of the paper, the report and the slides, the traceability data with its chec…

    TeX

  2. thesis-fentwums-container-extension thesis-fentwums-container-extension Public

    Master's thesis, TH Köln, 2026: containerized execution environments for open-source binaries in OneWare Studio. LaTeX sources, the evaluation with harness and data, the pinned submodules, errata a…

    TeX

  3. raven-one-simulink raven-one-simulink Public archive

    Bachelor's thesis, TH Köln, 2021: password and keyless authentication. Raven One SimuLink, the RSA and MD5 simulator in C# written for it, errata and the version of record.

    C#

  4. FEntwumS/FEntwumS.ContainerExtension FEntwumS/FEntwumS.ContainerExtension Public

    OneWare Studio plugin that runs FPGA toolchains (GHDL, Yosys, nextpnr, gmpack, Icarus, Verilator, SymbiYosys) inside containers without changing the user's workflow.

    C#

  5. template template Public template

    A GitHub repository template: README and citation skeletons, REUSE licensing, security and contribution notes, sponsor links, and pinned workflows that lint, validate and scan each repository.