fix: use bounded read for bundle download HTTP responses - #3764
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Quratulain-bilal wants to merge 2 commits into
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fix: use bounded read for bundle download HTTP responses#3764Quratulain-bilal wants to merge 2 commits into
Quratulain-bilal wants to merge 2 commits into
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Pull request overview
Bounds bundle HTTP response reads at 50 MiB to prevent memory exhaustion.
Changes:
- Replaces unbounded response reading with the shared limited-read helper.
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| File | Description |
|---|---|
src/specify_cli/commands/bundle/__init__.py |
Enforces the bundle download size limit. |
Review details
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- Files reviewed: 1/1 changed files
- Comments generated: 1
- Review effort level: Medium
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Thanks for the review! Regression test added in the latest push: All 32 bundle CLI tests pass. |
mnriem
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Please address Copilot feedback
The bundle download used unbounded resp.read() to read HTTP responses into memory. A malicious or misconfigured catalog server could return an arbitrarily large payload causing OOM. Replace with read_response_limited() capped at MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES (50 MiB), consistent with how other download paths in the codebase enforce bounded reads. Add regression test that monkeypatches MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES to 100 bytes and verifies oversized responses are rejected.
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Please resolve conflicts |
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Comments suppressed due to low confidence (1)
src/specify_cli/commands/bundle/init.py:19
- This duplicates the
_download_securityimport already present below, redefining both imported names. The repository's Ruff CI check (.github/workflows/test.yml:26-27) will reject this; keep a single import in the existing first-party order.
from ..._download_security import MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES, read_response_limited
- Files reviewed: 2/2 changed files
- Comments generated: 0 new
- Review effort level: Medium
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Summary
The bundle download in
commands/bundle/__init__.pyused unboundedresp.read()to read HTTP responses into memory. A malicious or misconfigured catalog server could return an arbitrarily large payload causing OOM.Changes
src/specify_cli/commands/bundle/__init__.py: Replacedresp.read()withread_response_limited(resp, max_bytes=MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES)capped at 50 MiB, consistent with how other download paths in the codebase enforce bounded reads.Testing
All 31 tests in
test_bundle_cli.pypass after the fix.Security Impact
This is a Medium severity fix - it closes a potential memory exhaustion vector against the bundle download endpoint. The 50 MiB limit is appropriate for bundle artifacts (ZIPs, archives) which are larger than JSON metadata but still bounded.