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fix: the odemu in ODEmu.c#8

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orbisai0security wants to merge 1 commit into
SynchronetBBS:masterfrom
orbisai0security:fix-v-001-odemu-buffer-overflow
Open

fix: the odemu in ODEmu.c#8
orbisai0security wants to merge 1 commit into
SynchronetBBS:masterfrom
orbisai0security:fix-v-001-odemu-buffer-overflow

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Summary

Fix critical severity security issue in src/odoors/ODEmu.c.

Vulnerability

Field Value
ID V-001
Severity CRITICAL
Scanner multi_agent_ai
Rule V-001
File src/odoors/ODEmu.c:301

Description: The ODEmu.c terminal emulation module copies filenames and RIP filenames into a fixed-size stack buffer (szODWorkString) using unbounded strcpy and strcat calls. At line 301, pszFileName is copied without any length check; at line 302, '.rip' is appended without verifying remaining space. At line 316, another unbounded copy of pszFileName occurs. Most critically, at line 344, od_control.od_sending_rip — a field that can be set by a remote BBS user — is copied without bounds checking. Any of these operations can overflow the destination buffer, overwriting the stack frame including the saved return address.

Changes

  • src/odoors/ODEmu.c

Verification

  • Build passes
  • Scanner re-scan confirms fix
  • LLM code review passed

Automated security fix by OrbisAI Security

Automated security fix generated by Orbis Security AI
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