Skip to content
Open
Show file tree
Hide file tree
Changes from all commits
Commits
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension

Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions README.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ The Python SDK offers a clean, type-safe API following Python best practices whi
- **ObjectStore Service**
- **Secret Resolver**
- **Telemetry & Observability**
- **Security Handler**
- **Data Anonymization Service**

## Requirements and Setup
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ Each module has comprehensive usage guides:
- [ObjectStore](src/sap_cloud_sdk/objectstore/user-guide.md)
- [Secret Resolver](src/sap_cloud_sdk/core/secret_resolver/user-guide.md)
- [Telemetry](src/sap_cloud_sdk/core/telemetry/user-guide.md)
- [Security Handler](src/sap_cloud_sdk/security_handler/user-guide.md)
- [Data Anonymization](src/sap_cloud_sdk/core/data_anonymization/user-guide.md)

## Support, Feedback, Contributing
Expand Down
174 changes: 174 additions & 0 deletions src/sap_cloud_sdk/security_handler/__init__.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
"""security_handler — Generic LLM security utilities for agent pipelines.
Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

if it's AI specific, security handler is too generic.


Provides a composable pre-LLM gate covering:
- Input sanitization (control chars, whitespace, length)
- Prompt injection detection (instruction override, persona redefinition,
safety bypass, system prompt extraction, templating tokens)
- Pluggable security guardrails (forbidden patterns, custom rules)

Typical usage::

from sap_cloud_sdk.security_handler import SecurityHandler

handler = SecurityHandler()
result = handler.scan(user_input)
if result.is_blocked:
raise ValueError(result.violations[0].description)
process(result.sanitized_text)

With custom config::

from sap_cloud_sdk.security_handler import SecurityHandler, SecurityConfig, Severity

handler = SecurityHandler(SecurityConfig(
min_blocking_severity=Severity.HIGH,
custom_forbidden_patterns=[r"competitor_name"],
))
"""

import logging
from dataclasses import dataclass, field

from .guardrails import ForbiddenPatternGuardrail, Guardrail
from .injection_detector import InjectionDetector, PatternRule
from .models import ScanResult, Severity, Violation, ViolationType
from .sanitizer import InputTooLongError, MAX_INPUT_LENGTH, escape_xml_tags, sanitize

logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)

_SEVERITY_ORDER: dict[Severity, int] = {
Severity.LOW: 1,
Severity.MEDIUM: 2,
Severity.HIGH: 3,
Severity.CRITICAL: 4,
}


@dataclass
class SecurityConfig:
"""Configuration for SecurityHandler.

Attributes:
max_input_length: Hard cap on input length. Inputs exceeding this are
blocked immediately without further scanning.
min_blocking_severity: Violations at or above this severity cause
is_blocked=True. Defaults to MEDIUM.
injection_detection: Enable/disable the built-in injection detector.
templating_token_detection: Enable/disable ${...}, {{...}}, <<...>> checks.
custom_forbidden_patterns: Extra case-insensitive regex patterns to treat
as forbidden (evaluated as a ForbiddenPatternGuardrail at HIGH severity).
extra_injection_rules: Additional PatternRule instances appended to the
built-in injection rule set.
custom_guardrails: Fully custom Guardrail implementations.
"""

max_input_length: int = MAX_INPUT_LENGTH
min_blocking_severity: Severity = Severity.MEDIUM
injection_detection: bool = True
templating_token_detection: bool = True
custom_forbidden_patterns: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
extra_injection_rules: list[PatternRule] = field(default_factory=list)
custom_guardrails: list[Guardrail] = field(default_factory=list)


class SecurityHandler:
"""Orchestrates sanitization, injection detection, and guardrail enforcement.

Designed as a pre-LLM gate: call scan() on every user message before it
reaches any prompt template or agent node.
"""

def __init__(self, config: SecurityConfig | None = None) -> None:
self.config = config or SecurityConfig()

self._detector = (
InjectionDetector(
extra_rules=self.config.extra_injection_rules,
include_templating_checks=self.config.templating_token_detection,
)
if self.config.injection_detection
else None
)

self._guardrails: list[Guardrail] = []
if self.config.custom_forbidden_patterns:
self._guardrails.append(
ForbiddenPatternGuardrail(self.config.custom_forbidden_patterns)
)
self._guardrails.extend(self.config.custom_guardrails)

def scan(self, text: str | None) -> ScanResult:
"""Sanitize and scan text for security violations.

Always returns a ScanResult. sanitized_text is safe to embed in a prompt.
is_blocked is True when any violation meets or exceeds
config.min_blocking_severity.
"""
if not text:
return ScanResult(original_text=text or "", sanitized_text=text or "")

violations: list[Violation] = []

# 1. Sanitize — strips control chars, normalises whitespace, enforces length.
try:
sanitized, san_violations = sanitize(text, self.config.max_input_length)
violations.extend(san_violations)
except InputTooLongError as exc:
violations.append(
Violation(
type=ViolationType.INPUT_TOO_LONG,
severity=Severity.HIGH,
description=str(exc),
)
)
return ScanResult(
original_text=text,
sanitized_text=text[: self.config.max_input_length],
violations=violations,
is_blocked=True,
)

sanitized = sanitized or ""

# 2. Injection detection.
if self._detector and sanitized:
violations.extend(self._detector.detect(sanitized))

# 3. Custom guardrails.
for guardrail in self._guardrails:
if sanitized:
violations.extend(guardrail.check(sanitized))

# 4. Block decision.
threshold = _SEVERITY_ORDER[self.config.min_blocking_severity]
is_blocked = any(_SEVERITY_ORDER[v.severity] >= threshold for v in violations)

if is_blocked:
logger.warning(
"SecurityHandler blocked input — %d violation(s): %s",
len(violations),
[v.description for v in violations],
)

return ScanResult(
original_text=text,
sanitized_text=sanitized,
violations=violations,
is_blocked=is_blocked,
)


__all__ = [
"SecurityHandler",
"SecurityConfig",
"ScanResult",
"Violation",
"Severity",
"ViolationType",
"Guardrail",
"ForbiddenPatternGuardrail",
"InjectionDetector",
"PatternRule",
"InputTooLongError",
"escape_xml_tags",
]
49 changes: 49 additions & 0 deletions src/sap_cloud_sdk/security_handler/guardrails.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
"""Security guardrails — composable, pluggable rule checks.

Extend Guardrail to add domain-specific rules without touching SecurityHandler.
"""

import re
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod

from .models import Severity, Violation, ViolationType


class Guardrail(ABC):
"""Pluggable guardrail interface. Implement check() to add custom rules."""

@abstractmethod
def check(self, text: str) -> list[Violation]: ...


class ForbiddenPatternGuardrail(Guardrail):
"""Block input matching any of the provided regex patterns (case-insensitive).

Useful for domain-specific banned terms, competitor names, or internal
code-words that should never appear in user input.
"""

def __init__(
self,
patterns: list[str],
severity: Severity = Severity.HIGH,
description_prefix: str = "Forbidden pattern matched",
) -> None:
self._compiled = [(re.compile(p, re.IGNORECASE), p) for p in patterns]
self._severity = severity
self._prefix = description_prefix

def check(self, text: str) -> list[Violation]:
violations: list[Violation] = []
for pattern, raw in self._compiled:
match = pattern.search(text)
if match:
violations.append(
Violation(
type=ViolationType.FORBIDDEN_PATTERN,
severity=self._severity,
description=f"{self._prefix}: {raw[:80]}",
matched_text=match.group(0)[:100],
)
)
return violations
137 changes: 137 additions & 0 deletions src/sap_cloud_sdk/security_handler/injection_detector.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
"""Prompt injection detector.

Detects instruction-override, persona-redefinition, safety-bypass, system-prompt
extraction, and templating-token patterns derived from:
- OWASP LLM Top 10 (LLM01 — Prompt Injection)
- Common jailbreak taxonomies (DAN, role-play, mode-activation)
- UCL security preamble injection-defense requirements

All violations are returned to the caller — blocking decisions live in SecurityHandler.
"""

import logging
import re
from typing import NamedTuple

from .models import Severity, Violation, ViolationType

logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)


class PatternRule(NamedTuple):
pattern: str
severity: Severity
description: str


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Default injection detection rules
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

_DEFAULT_RULES: list[PatternRule] = [
# --- Instruction override ---
PatternRule(
r"ignore\s+((?:previous|all|above|prior)\s+){1,3}(instructions?|prompts?|rules?|constraints?|context)",
Severity.CRITICAL,
"Instruction override attempt",
),
PatternRule(
r"(disregard|forget|bypass)\s+(your\s+)?(previous|all|above|prior)?\s*"
r"(instructions?|rules?|constraints?|guidelines?)",
Severity.CRITICAL,
"Instruction override attempt",
),
# --- Activation phrases / jailbreak modes ---
PatternRule(r"\bjailbreak\b", Severity.HIGH, "Jailbreak keyword"),
PatternRule(r"\bDAN\b", Severity.HIGH, "DAN jailbreak reference"),
PatternRule(
r"(developer|admin|god|unrestricted|unlocked|superuser)\s+"
r"(mode|access|prompt|instructions?)",
Severity.HIGH,
"Privileged mode activation attempt",
),
# --- Role / persona redefinition ---
PatternRule(
r"(act|pretend|imagine|suppose)\s+(you\s+)?(are|you'?re|as|to\s+be)\s+",
Severity.HIGH,
"Persona redefinition attempt",
),
PatternRule(
r"you\s+are\s+(now|a\s+new|no\s+longer)\s+",
Severity.HIGH,
"Identity override attempt",
),
PatternRule(r"role[\s-]?play\s+as\s+", Severity.MEDIUM, "Role-play directive"),
# --- Constraint / safety bypass ---
PatternRule(
r"(reset|unlock|remove|disable|override|bypass)\s+(your\s+)?"
r"(safety|restrictions?|constraints?|instructions?|rules?|filters?|guardrails?)",
Severity.HIGH,
"Safety bypass attempt",
),
PatternRule(
r"(new\s+)?(paradigm|context|persona|directive)\s*(:\s*|is\s+now\b|begins?\b)",
Severity.MEDIUM,
"Context redefinition attempt",
),
# --- System prompt extraction ---
PatternRule(
r"(reveal|show(?:\s+me)?|print|output|display|repeat|share|tell\s+me|what\s+(?:is|are))\s+"
r"(your\s+)?(system\s+)?(prompt|instructions?|rules?|directives?|preamble)",
Severity.HIGH,
"System prompt extraction attempt",
),
# --- Response prefix injection ---
PatternRule(
r"(start|begin)\s+(your\s+)?(response\s+)?(with|by\s+saying|with\s+the\s+words?)\s+[\"']",
Severity.LOW,
"Response prefix injection",
),
]

# Templating / shell-execution tokens (UCL preamble § Injection defenses)
_TEMPLATING_RULES: list[PatternRule] = [
PatternRule(r"\$\{[^}]{0,200}\}", Severity.MEDIUM, "Template token ${...}"),
PatternRule(r"\{\{[^}]{0,200}\}\}", Severity.MEDIUM, "Template token {{...}}"),
PatternRule(r"<<[^>]{0,200}>>", Severity.MEDIUM, "Template token <<...>>"),
PatternRule(r"#!\s*\S+", Severity.MEDIUM, "Shell-command token #!"),
]


class InjectionDetector:
"""Scan text for prompt injection patterns.

Returns all matching violations — the caller (SecurityHandler) decides
the blocking threshold.
"""

def __init__(
self,
extra_rules: list[PatternRule] | None = None,
include_templating_checks: bool = True,
) -> None:
rules: list[PatternRule] = list(_DEFAULT_RULES)
if include_templating_checks:
rules.extend(_TEMPLATING_RULES)
if extra_rules:
rules.extend(extra_rules)
self._compiled = [
(re.compile(r.pattern, re.IGNORECASE), r.severity, r.description)
for r in rules
]

def detect(self, text: str) -> list[Violation]:
"""Return all injection violations found in text. Does not modify text."""
violations: list[Violation] = []
for pattern, severity, description in self._compiled:
match = pattern.search(text)
if match:
violations.append(
Violation(
type=ViolationType.INJECTION_ATTEMPT,
severity=severity,
description=description,
matched_text=match.group(0)[:100],
)
)
return violations
Loading