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export const GROUP_TYPES = [
'ransomware',
'banking-theft',
'carding',
'financial-fraud',
'bec-fraud',
'crypto-crime',
'cybercrime',
'darknet-market',
'state-linked-theft',
'white-hat',
'hacktivist',
'hybrid',
'access-brokerage',
];
export const TYPE_META = {
ransomware: {
label: 'Ransomware',
color: '#ff4d73',
bg: 'rgba(255, 77, 115, 0.14)',
border: 'rgba(255, 77, 115, 0.28)',
},
'banking-theft': {
label: 'Banking Theft',
color: '#ff9d42',
bg: 'rgba(255, 157, 66, 0.14)',
border: 'rgba(255, 157, 66, 0.28)',
},
carding: {
label: 'Carding',
color: '#f5c842',
bg: 'rgba(245, 200, 66, 0.14)',
border: 'rgba(245, 200, 66, 0.28)',
},
'financial-fraud': {
label: 'Financial Fraud',
color: '#ff7b4a',
bg: 'rgba(255, 123, 74, 0.14)',
border: 'rgba(255, 123, 74, 0.28)',
},
'bec-fraud': {
label: 'BEC / Fraud',
color: '#ffd166',
bg: 'rgba(255, 209, 102, 0.14)',
border: 'rgba(255, 209, 102, 0.28)',
},
'crypto-crime': {
label: 'Crypto Crime',
color: '#c4a8ff',
bg: 'rgba(196, 168, 255, 0.14)',
border: 'rgba(196, 168, 255, 0.28)',
},
cybercrime: {
label: 'Cybercrime',
color: '#38c9e0',
bg: 'rgba(56, 201, 224, 0.14)',
border: 'rgba(56, 201, 224, 0.28)',
},
'darknet-market': {
label: 'Darknet Market',
color: '#b9ff66',
bg: 'rgba(185, 255, 102, 0.14)',
border: 'rgba(185, 255, 102, 0.28)',
},
'state-linked-theft': {
label: 'State-linked Theft',
color: '#8e8bff',
bg: 'rgba(142, 139, 255, 0.14)',
border: 'rgba(142, 139, 255, 0.28)',
},
'white-hat': {
label: 'White Hat',
color: '#49c8ff',
bg: 'rgba(73, 200, 255, 0.14)',
border: 'rgba(73, 200, 255, 0.28)',
},
hacktivist: {
label: 'Hacktivist',
color: '#5fe08f',
bg: 'rgba(95, 224, 143, 0.14)',
border: 'rgba(95, 224, 143, 0.28)',
},
hybrid: {
label: 'Hybrid',
color: '#ff6f91',
bg: 'rgba(255, 111, 145, 0.14)',
border: 'rgba(255, 111, 145, 0.28)',
},
'access-brokerage': {
label: 'Access Brokerage',
color: '#72a8ff',
bg: 'rgba(114, 168, 255, 0.14)',
border: 'rgba(114, 168, 255, 0.28)',
},
};
export const ORIGIN_METHOD_NOTE =
'Origins reflect public attribution for malicious actors and official organization origin for defensive groups. When reporting is only country-level, the pin is anchored to the national capital for map readability.';
export const GROUPS = [
{
id: 'andariel',
name: 'Andariel',
type: 'state-linked-theft',
country: 'North Korea',
city: 'Pyongyang',
lat: 39.0392,
lng: 125.7625,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2009,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['Silent Chollima', 'PLUTONIUM', 'Onyx Sleet'],
tags: ['bank theft', 'crypto theft', 'subgroup'],
knownFor: 'Conducting destructive and espionage-linked intrusions while also carrying out financially motivated attacks against ATMs, banks, and cryptocurrency organizations.',
attribution: 'MITRE ATT&CK tracks Andariel as a North Korean state-sponsored subgroup of Lazarus that has also conducted cyber financial operations.',
sourceLabel: 'MITRE ATT&CK, updated Sep 2024',
},
{
id: 'anonymous',
name: 'Anonymous',
type: 'hacktivist',
country: 'No fixed origin',
city: 'Decentralized',
lat: null,
lng: null,
originPrecision: 'No fixed origin / decentralized collective',
firstSeen: 2003,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['Anons'],
tags: ['decentralized', 'hacktivism', 'leaderless collective'],
knownFor: 'Coordinating high-profile hacktivist actions, website disruptions, leaks, and symbolic cyber campaigns against governments, companies, and institutions around the world.',
attribution: 'Public reporting consistently describes Anonymous as a decentralized international hacktivist collective with no fixed hierarchy or stable geographic origin.',
sourceLabel: 'Harvard Cybersecurity Wiki / Britannica',
},
{
id: 'antisec',
name: 'AntiSec',
type: 'hacktivist',
country: 'No fixed origin',
city: 'Decentralized',
lat: null,
lng: null,
originPrecision: 'No fixed origin / decentralized collective',
firstSeen: 2011,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['Operation AntiSec'],
tags: ['decentralized', 'hacktivism', 'movement'],
knownFor: 'Coordinating anti-security and anti-surveillance themed hacking campaigns, leaks, and defacements under a broader Anonymous- and LulzSec-linked banner.',
attribution: 'Public reporting and the movement’s own statements describe AntiSec as a loose collaborative operation associated with Anonymous and LulzSec rather than a single geographically rooted organization.',
sourceLabel: 'Wired / public reporting',
},
{
id: 'applejeus',
name: 'AppleJeus',
type: 'crypto-crime',
country: 'North Korea',
city: 'Pyongyang',
lat: 39.0392,
lng: 125.7625,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2018,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: [],
tags: ['trojanized apps', 'crypto theft', 'fake trading software'],
knownFor: 'Posing as legitimate cryptocurrency tools and trading platforms to infect victims and facilitate theft tied to North Korean cyber operations.',
attribution: 'CISA, FBI, and Treasury describe AppleJeus as North Korean malicious cyber activity used to facilitate cryptocurrency theft; the atlas maps that activity to North Korea at country level.',
sourceLabel: 'CISA / FBI / Treasury, Feb 2021',
},
{
id: 'apt-c-36',
name: 'APT-C-36',
type: 'state-linked-theft',
country: 'Colombia',
city: 'Bogota',
lat: 4.711,
lng: -74.0721,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2018,
scope: 'Regional',
aliases: ['Blind Eagle'],
tags: ['South America', 'espionage', 'phishing'],
knownFor: 'Running espionage-oriented campaigns that primarily target Colombian government institutions and key private-sector organizations in finance, energy, and manufacturing.',
attribution: 'MITRE ATT&CK tracks APT-C-36 as a suspected South America espionage group focused mainly on Colombian institutions; the atlas uses Colombia as the clearest regional origin inference and pins to Bogota.',
sourceLabel: 'MITRE ATT&CK, updated Apr 2025',
},
{
id: 'apt28',
name: 'APT28',
type: 'state-linked-theft',
country: 'Russia',
city: 'Moscow',
lat: 55.7558,
lng: 37.6173,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2004,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['Fancy Bear', 'Sofacy', 'Forest Blizzard', 'STRONTIUM'],
tags: ['GRU-linked', 'espionage', 'influence ops'],
knownFor: 'Running one of the most recognizable Russian military cyber programs, including espionage, credential theft, and influence-linked intrusion activity.',
attribution: 'MITRE ATT&CK tracks APT28 as a Russian state-sponsored group commonly linked to the GRU; the map uses a country-level Russia attribution pinned to Moscow.',
sourceLabel: 'MITRE ATT&CK, updated Apr 2025',
},
{
id: 'apt29',
name: 'APT29',
type: 'state-linked-theft',
country: 'Russia',
city: 'Moscow',
lat: 55.7558,
lng: 37.6173,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2008,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['Cozy Bear', 'Midnight Blizzard', 'The Dukes'],
tags: ['espionage', 'supply chain'],
knownFor: 'Conducting long-running espionage campaigns against governments, diplomatic targets, and major enterprises, including some of the most widely reported supply-chain intrusions.',
attribution: 'MITRE ATT&CK identifies APT29 as a Russian state-sponsored espionage group; the map uses Russia at country level and pins to Moscow for readability.',
sourceLabel: 'MITRE ATT&CK, updated Apr 2025',
},
{
id: 'apt38',
name: 'APT38',
type: 'state-linked-theft',
country: 'North Korea',
city: 'Pyongyang',
lat: 39.0392,
lng: 125.7625,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2014,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['Bluenoroff', 'BeagleBoyz', 'Sapphire Sleet'],
tags: ['bank heists', 'SWIFT theft'],
knownFor: 'Specializing in financial cyber operations against banks, casinos, exchanges, and ATM/SWIFT infrastructure worldwide.',
attribution: 'MITRE ATT&CK attributes APT38 to North Korea and describes it as a group focused on financial theft.',
sourceLabel: 'MITRE ATT&CK, updated Jan 2025',
},
{
id: 'apt41',
name: 'APT41',
type: 'hybrid',
country: 'China',
city: 'Beijing',
lat: 39.9042,
lng: 116.4074,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2012,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['Wicked Panda', 'Brass Typhoon', 'BARIUM'],
tags: ['espionage + profit', 'supply chain'],
knownFor: 'Mixing state-sponsored espionage with financially motivated intrusions, including targeting software supply chains and commercial sectors.',
attribution: 'MITRE ATT&CK assesses APT41 as a Chinese state-sponsored group that also conducts financially motivated operations.',
sourceLabel: 'MITRE ATT&CK, updated Jun 2025',
},
{
id: 'bianlian',
name: 'BianLian',
type: 'ransomware',
country: 'Russia',
city: 'Moscow',
lat: 55.7558,
lng: 37.6173,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2022,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: [],
tags: ['data extortion', 'healthcare targeting'],
knownFor: 'Running ransomware and later primarily data-extortion campaigns against organizations across critical infrastructure and professional services sectors.',
attribution: 'CISA, FBI, and partner agencies assess BianLian is likely based in Russia and operates with Russia-based affiliates.',
sourceLabel: 'CISA / FBI / ACSC, Nov 2024',
},
{
id: 'blackbyte',
name: 'BlackByte',
type: 'ransomware',
country: 'Russia',
city: 'Moscow',
lat: 55.7558,
lng: 37.6173,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2021,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['Hecamede'],
tags: ['RaaS', 'critical infrastructure targeting'],
knownFor: 'Operating a ransomware program that gained attention for attacks on critical infrastructure and for quickly iterating its malware after public decryptors appeared.',
attribution: 'MITRE ATT&CK tracks BlackByte as a prominent ransomware actor; public reporting frequently treats the operation as Russian-speaking or Russia-linked, and the atlas reflects that as a country-level inference rather than a settled legal finding.',
sourceLabel: 'MITRE ATT&CK / public reporting',
},
{
id: 'business-club',
name: 'Business Club',
type: 'financial-fraud',
country: 'Russia',
city: 'Moscow',
lat: 55.7558,
lng: 37.6173,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2007,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['GameOver Zeus', 'GOLD EVERGREEN'],
tags: ['bank fraud', 'botnet operations', 'wire theft'],
knownFor: 'Stealing banking credentials at massive scale through Zeus variants and using infected systems to enable large international wire-fraud operations.',
attribution: 'DOJ and FBI reporting tied GameOver Zeus to Evgeniy Bogachev and a gang of cyber criminals based in Russia and Ukraine; this atlas uses Russia as the primary country-level origin for a simplified map pin.',
sourceLabel: 'DOJ / FBI, 2014-2015',
},
{
id: 'cert-cc',
name: 'CERT Coordination Center',
type: 'white-hat',
country: 'United States',
city: 'Pittsburgh',
lat: 40.4406,
lng: -79.9959,
originPrecision: 'City-level attribution from public reporting',
firstSeen: 1988,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['CERT/CC'],
tags: ['incident coordination', 'vulnerability disclosure'],
knownFor: 'Coordinating vulnerability disclosure, publishing security research, and developing methods and tools that improve software and network resilience.',
attribution: 'The CERT/CC identifies itself as part of Carnegie Mellon\'s Software Engineering Institute, and its public organization materials locate it in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.',
sourceLabel: 'CERT/CC / SEI',
},
{
id: 'cert-br',
name: 'CERT.br',
type: 'white-hat',
country: 'Brazil',
city: 'Sao Paulo',
lat: -23.5558,
lng: -46.6396,
originPrecision: 'City-level attribution from public reporting',
firstSeen: 1997,
scope: 'Regional',
aliases: [],
tags: ['national CSIRT', 'incident coordination', 'Brazil'],
knownFor: 'Coordinating national incident response in Brazil while publishing statistics, running sensor projects, and supporting community knowledge transfer.',
attribution: 'CERT.br describes itself as Brazil\'s national CSIRT of last resort maintained by NIC.br; the atlas uses Sao Paulo as the organization origin point.',
sourceLabel: 'CERT.br official site',
},
{
id: 'cisa',
name: 'CISA',
type: 'white-hat',
country: 'United States',
city: 'Washington, DC',
lat: 38.9072,
lng: -77.0369,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2018,
scope: 'National',
aliases: ['Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency'],
tags: ['critical infrastructure', 'advisories'],
knownFor: 'Publishing joint advisories, incident guidance, and defensive resources for critical infrastructure owners, governments, and private-sector defenders.',
attribution: 'CISA is the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency; the pin uses the agency\'s official Washington, DC main address for map readability.',
sourceLabel: 'CISA / USAGov',
},
{
id: 'cisco-talos',
name: 'Cisco Talos',
type: 'white-hat',
country: 'United States',
city: 'San Jose',
lat: 37.3382,
lng: -121.8863,
originPrecision: 'City-level attribution from public reporting',
firstSeen: 2014,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: [],
tags: ['threat intelligence', 'incident response', 'malware research'],
knownFor: 'Providing some of the most widely cited public malware analysis, incident response research, and defensive threat intelligence in the industry.',
attribution: 'Cisco describes Talos as its threat intelligence team; the pin uses Cisco\'s official San Jose headquarters as the organization origin.',
sourceLabel: 'Cisco official site',
},
{
id: 'cosmic-lynx',
name: 'Cosmic Lynx',
type: 'financial-fraud',
country: 'Russia',
city: 'Moscow',
lat: 55.7558,
lng: 37.6173,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2019,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: [],
tags: ['BEC', 'invoice fraud', 'M&A pretexting'],
knownFor: 'Running high-value business email compromise schemes that impersonate executives and outside counsel to trigger fraudulent payments.',
attribution: 'Agari\'s threat dossier describes Cosmic Lynx as a Russia-based BEC cybercriminal organization targeting large multinational companies.',
sourceLabel: 'Agari / Fortra, Jul 2020',
},
{
id: 'crowdstrike-intelligence',
name: 'CrowdStrike Intelligence',
type: 'white-hat',
country: 'United States',
city: 'Austin',
lat: 30.2672,
lng: -97.7431,
originPrecision: 'City-level attribution from public reporting',
firstSeen: 2018,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['Falcon Adversary Intelligence'],
tags: ['adversary profiles', 'threat intelligence', 'research'],
knownFor: 'Maintaining one of the most visible public actor-naming and adversary-profiling systems used across the security industry.',
attribution: 'CrowdStrike markets Falcon Adversary Intelligence as part of its threat intelligence platform, and recent official releases identify Austin, Texas as the company headquarters location used here.',
sourceLabel: 'CrowdStrike official site',
},
{
id: 'cyberav3ngers',
name: 'CyberAv3ngers',
type: 'hacktivist',
country: 'Iran',
city: 'Tehran',
lat: 35.6892,
lng: 51.389,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2020,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['Soldiers of Solomon'],
tags: ['PLC defacement', 'IRGC-linked'],
knownFor: 'Claiming and conducting disruptive operations against industrial control environments, especially Unitronics PLC and HMI targets.',
attribution: 'MITRE ATT&CK tracks CyberAv3ngers as a suspected Iranian IRGC-affiliated group active in politically motivated disruption campaigns.',
sourceLabel: 'MITRE ATT&CK / CISA',
},
{
id: 'danabot',
name: 'DanaBot Organization',
type: 'banking-theft',
country: 'Russia',
city: 'Novosibirsk',
lat: 55.0084,
lng: 82.9357,
originPrecision: 'City-level attribution from public reporting',
firstSeen: 2018,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['DanaBot operators'],
tags: ['banking trojan', 'fraud infrastructure'],
knownFor: 'Operating malware that infected hundreds of thousands of machines and enabled fraud, credential theft, and ransomware delivery.',
attribution: 'The 2025 U.S. indictment describes DanaBot as controlled by a Russia-based cybercrime organization and names operators from Novosibirsk.',
sourceLabel: 'DOJ, May 2025',
},
{
id: 'eset-research',
name: 'ESET Research',
type: 'white-hat',
country: 'Slovakia',
city: 'Bratislava',
lat: 48.1486,
lng: 17.1077,
originPrecision: 'City-level attribution from public reporting',
firstSeen: 2015,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: [],
tags: ['malware research', 'disruption support', 'threat intelligence'],
knownFor: 'Publishing influential technical research and frequently participating in multinational disruption efforts against malware and financial crime operations.',
attribution: 'ESET identifies Bratislava as its headquarters, and the atlas uses that location for ESET Research as the company’s research organization origin.',
sourceLabel: 'ESET official site',
},
{
id: 'evil-corp',
name: 'Evil Corp',
type: 'banking-theft',
country: 'Russia',
city: 'Moscow',
lat: 55.7558,
lng: 37.6173,
originPrecision: 'City-level attribution from public reporting',
firstSeen: 2009,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['Indrik Spider', 'Manatee Tempest', 'DEV-0243', 'UNC2165', 'Dridex crew'],
tags: ['Dridex', 'BitPaymer', 'WastedLocker'],
knownFor: 'Large-scale credential theft, bank fraud, and later ransomware and extortion activity tied to the Dridex, BitPaymer, WastedLocker, and Hades ecosystems.',
attribution: 'U.S. Treasury and MITRE ATT&CK reporting describe Evil Corp, also tracked as Indrik Spider, as a Russia-based cybercriminal organization operating from Moscow and evolving from banking malware into major ransomware operations.',
sourceLabel: 'U.S. Treasury / MITRE ATT&CK',
},
{
id: 'fin5',
name: 'FIN5',
type: 'carding',
country: 'Russia',
city: 'Moscow',
lat: 55.7558,
lng: 37.6173,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2008,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: [],
tags: ['card theft', 'PII theft', 'hospitality targeting'],
knownFor: 'Stealing payment card and personal data from hospitality, gaming, and retail-adjacent targets as part of a long-running financially motivated intrusion program.',
attribution: 'MITRE ATT&CK describes FIN5 as a financially motivated group whose operators likely speak Russian; the atlas represents that recurring public attribution trend with a country-level Russia pin.',
sourceLabel: 'MITRE ATT&CK, updated Apr 2025',
},
{
id: 'fin6',
name: 'FIN6',
type: 'carding',
country: 'Russia',
city: 'Moscow',
lat: 55.7558,
lng: 37.6173,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2012,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['Skeleton Spider', 'Magecart Group 6', 'Camouflage Tempest'],
tags: ['POS theft', 'carding', 'retail targeting'],
knownFor: 'Specializing in payment-card theft and monetization, especially through PoS compromises and follow-on underground sales of stolen data.',
attribution: 'MITRE ATT&CK tracks FIN6 as a major cybercrime group; open reporting often places its ecosystem in the Russian-speaking cybercrime scene, which this atlas reflects as a cautious country-level Russia inference.',
sourceLabel: 'MITRE ATT&CK / public reporting',
},
{
id: 'fin7',
name: 'FIN7',
type: 'carding',
country: 'Ukraine',
city: 'Kyiv',
lat: 50.4501,
lng: 30.5234,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2013,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['Carbon Spider', 'GOLD NIAGARA', 'Carbanak-linked'],
tags: ['POS intrusions', 'front company'],
knownFor: 'Stealing payment-card data from retail and hospitality targets before expanding into big-game hunting ransomware operations.',
attribution: 'MITRE tracks FIN7 as financially motivated and says part of the group operated through the Combi Security front company; DOJ cases charged multiple Ukrainian nationals.',
sourceLabel: 'MITRE ATT&CK / DOJ',
},
{
id: 'gamaredon-group',
name: 'Gamaredon Group',
type: 'state-linked-theft',
country: 'Russia',
city: 'Moscow',
lat: 55.7558,
lng: 37.6173,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2013,
scope: 'Regional',
aliases: ['Shuckworm', 'Primitive Bear', 'Armageddon', 'ACTINIUM', 'DEV-0157', 'Aqua Blizzard'],
tags: ['Eastern Europe', 'espionage', 'Ukraine targeting'],
knownFor: 'Conducting high-volume, persistent espionage operations against military, law enforcement, and civil-society targets in Ukraine through fast-iterating malware and lures.',
attribution: 'MITRE ATT&CK and public Ukrainian government attribution describe Gamaredon Group as a suspected Russian espionage actor later publicly tied to the FSB.',
sourceLabel: 'MITRE ATT&CK, updated Oct 2025',
},
{
id: 'gold-barondale',
name: 'GOLD BARONDALE',
type: 'access-brokerage',
country: 'China',
city: 'Beijing',
lat: 39.9042,
lng: 116.4074,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2022,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: [],
tags: ['opportunistic exploitation', 'initial access'],
knownFor: 'Compromising internet-facing systems at scale and monetizing intrusions after opportunistic scanning and exploitation.',
attribution: 'Secureworks assesses with moderate confidence that GOLD BARONDALE is based in China.',
sourceLabel: 'Secureworks CTU',
},
{
id: 'gold-galleon',
name: 'GOLD GALLEON',
type: 'bec-fraud',
country: 'Nigeria',
city: 'Abuja',
lat: 9.0765,
lng: 7.3986,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2017,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: [],
tags: ['maritime BEC', 'credential theft'],
knownFor: 'Running BEC schemes against shipping and maritime organizations, often intercepting invoices and payment instructions.',
attribution: 'Secureworks assesses with high confidence that GOLD GALLEON is based in Nigeria.',
sourceLabel: 'Secureworks CTU, Apr 2018 / profile',
},
{
id: 'gold-parakeet',
name: 'GOLD PARAKEET',
type: 'ransomware',
country: 'Russia',
city: 'Moscow',
lat: 55.7558,
lng: 37.6173,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2019,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['NetWalker operators'],
tags: ['NetWalker', 'RaaS', 'double extortion'],
knownFor: 'Operating the NetWalker ransomware program and evolving it into a ransomware-as-a-service model with large-scale data-theft extortion.',
attribution: 'Secureworks attributes GOLD PARAKEET to Russian cyber threat actors with moderate confidence; the atlas keeps that wording cautious and uses a country-level Russia pin.',
sourceLabel: 'Secureworks CTU',
},
{
id: 'gold-skyline',
name: 'GOLD SKYLINE',
type: 'bec-fraud',
country: 'Nigeria',
city: 'Abuja',
lat: 9.0765,
lng: 7.3986,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2016,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['Wire-Wire Group 1'],
tags: ['BEC', 'wire fraud'],
knownFor: 'Stealing high-value wire transfers through business email compromise, spoofing, and social engineering.',
attribution: 'Secureworks describes GOLD SKYLINE as a financially motivated group operating from Nigeria.',
sourceLabel: 'Secureworks CTU',
},
{
id: 'gold-symphony',
name: 'GOLD SYMPHONY',
type: 'access-brokerage',
country: 'Russia',
city: 'Moscow',
lat: 55.7558,
lng: 37.6173,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2019,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: [],
tags: ['Buer Loader', 'malware-as-a-service'],
knownFor: 'Developing and selling the Buer Loader malware-as-a-service ecosystem used to deliver follow-on payloads for financially motivated intrusions.',
attribution: 'Secureworks assesses with high confidence that GOLD SYMPHONY is likely based in Russia, which this atlas represents with a country-level Moscow pin.',
sourceLabel: 'Secureworks CTU',
},
{
id: 'gold-waterfall',
name: 'GOLD WATERFALL',
type: 'ransomware',
country: 'Russia',
city: 'Moscow',
lat: 55.7558,
lng: 37.6173,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2020,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['DarkSide operators', 'BlackMatter operators'],
tags: ['RaaS', 'double extortion', 'Russian-language'],
knownFor: 'Creating and operating the DarkSide and BlackMatter ransomware families, including high-profile extortion campaigns against critical enterprises.',
attribution: 'Secureworks says GOLD WATERFALL advertises in Russian, requires affiliates to speak Russian, and excludes Russia and nearby allies from targeting; the atlas maps that activity to Russia at country level.',
sourceLabel: 'Secureworks CTU',
},
{
id: 'google-threat-intelligence',
name: 'Google Threat Intelligence',
type: 'white-hat',
country: 'United States',
city: 'Mountain View',
lat: 37.3861,
lng: -122.0839,
originPrecision: 'City-level attribution from public reporting',
firstSeen: 2024,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: [],
tags: ['threat intelligence', 'zero-days', 'research'],
knownFor: 'Publishing prominent frontline reporting on state and criminal actors, zero-day exploitation trends, and threat activity affecting global enterprises and governments.',
attribution: 'Google Cloud currently markets this work under the Google Threat Intelligence brand, with GTIG research and Mandiant intelligence offerings presented inside that umbrella; the pin uses Google\'s official Mountain View headquarters as the organization origin.',
sourceLabel: 'Google Cloud',
},
{
id: 'gorgon-group',
name: 'Gorgon Group',
type: 'hybrid',
country: 'Pakistan',
city: 'Islamabad',
lat: 33.6844,
lng: 73.0479,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2018,
scope: 'Regional',
aliases: [],
tags: ['criminal + targeted', 'phishing'],
knownFor: 'Running mixed campaigns that blend financially motivated intrusions with more targeted operations against government and business victims.',
attribution: 'MITRE ATT&CK assesses the group as Pakistan-based or otherwise connected to Pakistan.',
sourceLabel: 'MITRE ATT&CK, updated Apr 2025',
},
{
id: 'grandoreiro',
name: 'Grandoreiro',
type: 'banking-theft',
country: 'Brazil',
city: 'Brasilia',
lat: -15.7939,
lng: -47.8828,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2017,
scope: 'Regional',
aliases: ['Grandoreiro operation'],
tags: ['banking trojan', 'phishing'],
knownFor: 'Targeting banks in Latin America and Europe with malware that supports manual fraud, screen blocking, and operator-driven theft.',
attribution: 'ESET and Brazil’s Federal Police publicly tied the operation to Brazilian operators during the 2024 disruption effort.',
sourceLabel: 'ESET / Brazil Federal Police',
},
{
id: 'guildma',
name: 'Guildma',
type: 'banking-theft',
country: 'Brazil',
city: 'Brasilia',
lat: -15.7939,
lng: -47.8828,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2015,
scope: 'Regional',
aliases: ['Astaroth-linked family'],
tags: ['banking trojan', 'credential theft'],
knownFor: 'Stealing banking and account credentials at high volume in Brazil and across Latin America through email-delivered malware.',
attribution: 'ESET identifies Guildma as one of the most impactful Latin American banking trojans and reports concentrated activity against Brazil.',
sourceLabel: 'ESET, Mar 2020',
},
{
id: 'huntress',
name: 'Huntress',
type: 'white-hat',
country: 'United States',
city: 'Columbia',
lat: 39.2037,
lng: -76.861,
originPrecision: 'City-level attribution from public reporting',
firstSeen: 2015,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: [],
tags: ['managed detection', 'threat hunting', 'community reporting'],
knownFor: 'Combining managed detection with rapid public writeups and incident guidance aimed especially at organizations without large internal security teams.',
attribution: 'Huntress official releases identify the company with Columbia, Maryland, which this atlas uses as the organization origin point.',
sourceLabel: 'Huntress official site',
},
{
id: 'hydra-market',
name: 'Hydra Market',
type: 'darknet-market',
country: 'Russia',
city: 'Moscow',
lat: 55.7558,
lng: 37.6173,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2015,
scope: 'Regional',
aliases: ['Hydra'],
tags: ['darknet marketplace', 'criminal services'],
knownFor: 'Serving Russian-speaking criminal users with illicit goods, stolen data, money-laundering services, and hacking tools.',
attribution: 'The DOJ described Hydra as the largest darknet market at the time of its 2022 seizure and linked it to a Russian resident.',
sourceLabel: 'DOJ, Apr 2022',
},
{
id: 'insikt-group',
name: 'Insikt Group',
type: 'white-hat',
country: 'United States',
city: 'Somerville',
lat: 42.3876,
lng: -71.0995,
originPrecision: 'City-level attribution from public reporting',
firstSeen: 2019,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: [],
tags: ['threat research', 'OSINT', 'intelligence reports'],
knownFor: 'Producing widely cited intelligence on cybercriminal ecosystems, state activity, vulnerabilities, and geopolitical risk through Recorded Future.',
attribution: 'Recorded Future describes Insikt Group as its premier intelligence team and lists a Somerville, Massachusetts office on its official contact page.',
sourceLabel: 'Recorded Future',
},
{
id: 'jpcert-cc',
name: 'JPCERT/CC',
type: 'white-hat',
country: 'Japan',
city: 'Tokyo',
lat: 35.6762,
lng: 139.6503,
originPrecision: 'City-level attribution from public reporting',
firstSeen: 1996,
scope: 'Regional',
aliases: [],
tags: ['CSIRT', 'coordination', 'Asia Pacific'],
knownFor: 'Serving as Japan\'s long-running incident coordination center and playing a central role in regional CSIRT collaboration, vulnerability handling, and threat analysis.',
attribution: 'JPCERT/CC identifies itself as Japan\'s first CSIRT and lists its office address in Tokyo, which the atlas uses as its organization origin.',
sourceLabel: 'JPCERT/CC official site',
},
{
id: 'lapsus',
name: 'LAPSUS$',
type: 'hybrid',
country: 'Brazil',
city: 'Brasilia',
lat: -15.7939,
lng: -47.8828,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2021,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['DEV-0537', 'Strawberry Tempest'],
tags: ['extortion', 'social engineering', 'data theft'],
knownFor: 'Using aggressive social engineering, insider recruitment, SIM swapping, and public leak tactics to hit globally recognized technology and telecom targets.',
attribution: 'Public reporting and arrests have linked prominent LAPSUS$ members to Brazil and the UK; this atlas uses Brazil as the strongest country-level origin inference and pins to Brasilia for consistency.',
sourceLabel: 'MITRE ATT&CK / public reporting',
},
{
id: 'lazarus-group',
name: 'Lazarus Group',
type: 'state-linked-theft',
country: 'North Korea',
city: 'Pyongyang',
lat: 39.0392,
lng: 125.7625,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2009,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['HIDDEN COBRA', 'Diamond Sleet', 'ZINC'],
tags: ['crypto theft', 'state-backed'],
knownFor: 'Conducting destructive attacks, espionage, and high-value cryptocurrency theft campaigns attributed to North Korea.',
attribution: 'MITRE ATT&CK tracks Lazarus as a North Korean state-sponsored group tied to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.',
sourceLabel: 'MITRE ATT&CK',
},
{
id: 'lockbit',
name: 'LockBit',
type: 'ransomware',
country: 'Russia',
city: 'Moscow',
lat: 55.7558,
lng: 37.6173,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2019,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['LockBitSupp', 'GOLD MYSTIC'],
tags: ['RaaS', 'double extortion'],
knownFor: 'Operating one of the most prolific ransomware-as-a-service programs on record, with thousands of victims across more than 100 countries.',
attribution: 'U.S. prosecutors identified Russian national Dmitry Khoroshev as LockBit’s alleged developer and administrator in 2024.',
sourceLabel: 'DOJ, May 2024',
},
{
id: 'lulzsec',
name: 'LulzSec',
type: 'hacktivist',
country: 'No fixed origin',
city: 'Decentralized',
lat: null,
lng: null,
originPrecision: 'No fixed origin / decentralized collective',
firstSeen: 2011,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['Lulz Security'],
tags: ['decentralized', 'hacktivism', 'splinter collective'],
knownFor: 'Carrying out a fast, high-profile run of disruptive hacks, leaks, and humiliating breaches against media, gaming, government, and security targets during 2011.',
attribution: 'Public reporting describes LulzSec as a short-lived hacking collective and an offshoot of the broader Anonymous ecosystem, with members in multiple countries rather than a stable shared origin.',
sourceLabel: 'Wired / public reporting',
},
{
id: 'machete',
name: 'Machete',
type: 'state-linked-theft',
country: 'Venezuela',
city: 'Caracas',
lat: 10.4806,
lng: -66.9036,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2010,
scope: 'Regional',
aliases: ['APT-C-43', 'El Machete'],
tags: ['Latin America', 'espionage', 'government targeting'],
knownFor: 'Conducting sustained Spanish-language espionage against governments, military organizations, and telecom and power-sector targets across Latin America.',
attribution: 'MITRE ATT&CK describes Machete as a suspected Spanish-speaking espionage group with a particular emphasis on Venezuela, which this atlas uses as a country-level origin inference.',
sourceLabel: 'MITRE ATT&CK, updated Apr 2025',
},
{
id: 'malteiro',
name: 'Malteiro',
type: 'banking-theft',
country: 'Brazil',
city: 'Brasilia',
lat: -15.7939,
lng: -47.8828,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2019,
scope: 'Regional',
aliases: [],
tags: ['MaaS', 'Mispadu'],
knownFor: 'Operating a Malware-as-a-Service model around the Mispadu banking trojan for fraud and credential theft across Latin America and Europe.',
attribution: 'MITRE ATT&CK describes Malteiro as a financially motivated criminal group that is likely based in Brazil.',
sourceLabel: 'MITRE ATT&CK, Mar 2024',
},
{
id: 'mario-kart',
name: 'Mario Kart',
type: 'access-brokerage',
country: 'Russia',
city: 'Tolyatti',
lat: 53.5078,
lng: 49.4204,
originPrecision: 'City-level attribution from public reporting',
firstSeen: 2017,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['TA551', 'Shathak', 'GOLD CABIN'],
tags: ['botnet sales', 'spam delivery'],
knownFor: 'Building a spam-delivered botnet and selling access to other actors who used that access for ransomware extortion.',
attribution: 'DOJ described Mario Kart as a Russia-based cybercriminal group and tied a co-manager to Tolyatti, Russia.',
sourceLabel: 'DOJ, Mar 2026',
},
{
id: 'medusa-group',
name: 'Medusa Group',
type: 'ransomware',
country: 'Russia',
city: 'Moscow',
lat: 55.7558,
lng: 37.6173,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2021,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['Spearwing', 'Medusa Actors'],
tags: ['RaaS', 'double extortion'],
knownFor: 'Operating a rapidly growing ransomware program that blends credential theft, exploit-driven access, and double extortion against critical-sector victims.',
attribution: 'MITRE ATT&CK documents Medusa Group as a major ransomware actor; because public reporting on origin is mixed, this atlas uses a cautious Russia/CIS-oriented country inference commonly reflected in vendor reporting.',
sourceLabel: 'MITRE ATT&CK / public reporting',
},
{
id: 'microsoft-threat-intelligence',
name: 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center',
type: 'white-hat',
country: 'United States',
city: 'Redmond',
lat: 47.674,
lng: -122.1215,
originPrecision: 'City-level attribution from public reporting',
firstSeen: 2022,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: [],
tags: ['threat intelligence', 'disruption', 'research'],
knownFor: 'Publishing widely used actor tracking, malware analysis, disruption reporting, and intelligence-led guidance consumed across the security industry.',
attribution: 'Microsoft describes its threat analysis and threat intelligence work as part of its security operations; the pin uses Microsoft\'s official Redmond headquarters as the organization origin.',
sourceLabel: 'Microsoft official site',
},
{
id: 'moneytaker',
name: 'MoneyTaker',
type: 'financial-fraud',
country: 'Russia',
city: 'Moscow',
lat: 55.7558,
lng: 37.6173,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2016,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: [],
tags: ['SWIFT theft', 'card processing', 'bank intrusions'],
knownFor: 'Targeting banks, card-processing systems, and interbank transfer infrastructure to steal funds and operational documentation for follow-on attacks.',
attribution: 'Group-IB described MoneyTaker as a Russian-speaking targeted attack group; this atlas simplifies that reporting to a country-level Russia origin pin for map readability.',
sourceLabel: 'Group-IB, Dec 2017',
},
{
id: 'moonstone-sleet',
name: 'Moonstone Sleet',
type: 'hybrid',
country: 'North Korea',
city: 'Pyongyang',
lat: 39.0392,
lng: 125.7625,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2023,
scope: 'Global',
aliases: ['Storm-1789'],
tags: ['espionage + extortion', 'fake companies'],
knownFor: 'Combining espionage tradecraft with financially motivated operations, including social engineering, trojanized software, and ransomware deployment.',
attribution: 'MITRE ATT&CK tracks Moonstone Sleet as a North Korean-linked threat actor executing both financially motivated attacks and espionage operations.',
sourceLabel: 'MITRE ATT&CK, Oct 2024',
},
{
id: 'moses-staff',
name: 'Moses Staff',
type: 'hacktivist',
country: 'Iran',
city: 'Tehran',
lat: 35.6892,
lng: 51.389,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2021,
scope: 'Regional',
aliases: ['DEV-0500', 'Marigold Sandstorm'],
tags: ['wiper-like attacks', 'leak-and-damage'],
knownFor: 'Combining data leaks, destructive encryption, and politically motivated attacks without following a conventional ransom model.',
attribution: 'MITRE ATT&CK identifies Moses Staff as a suspected Iranian threat group whose operations are assessed as politically motivated.',
sourceLabel: 'MITRE ATT&CK, updated Apr 2024',
},
{
id: 'muddywater',
name: 'MuddyWater',
type: 'state-linked-theft',
country: 'Iran',
city: 'Tehran',
lat: 35.6892,
lng: 51.389,
originPrecision: 'Country-level attribution pinned to capital',
firstSeen: 2017,
scope: 'Regional',
aliases: ['Earth Vetala', 'MERCURY', 'Static Kitten', 'Seedworm', 'TEMP.Zagros', 'Mango Sandstorm', 'TA450'],
tags: ['Middle East', 'espionage', 'MOIS-linked'],
knownFor: 'Using broad phishing and PowerShell-heavy intrusion tradecraft against government, telecom, defense, and energy-sector organizations across the Middle East and beyond.',
attribution: 'MITRE ATT&CK assesses MuddyWater to be a subordinate element within Iran\'s Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and the atlas maps that activity to Tehran at country level.',